TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/031191/03119915.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 5.9 KB | 123 lines

                                                                                THE GULF WAR, Page 51

FRANCE

"Fighting for the Same Cause"


French forces showed that their presence in the gulf was much
more than a beau geste

By FREDERICK UNGEHEUER/PARIS


    When a French force under General Jean Baptiste Rochambeau
linked up with George Washington's revolutionary army in 1781
to fight the British, France became America's first wartime
ally. Thus it was fitting that the code word assigned to the
first target in the French-U.S. thrust into Iraq was
Rochambeau. The choice not only saluted France's fighting
commitment to the allied cause but also symbolized France's
newfound solidarity with the U.S. when war came.

    Nowhere was the sight of the French tricolor flying above
advancing armor greeted with more relief than at allied
headquarters in the gulf. When Desert Storm began, there had
been fears that the 12,600-strong French contingent, reluctant
to accept U.S. leadership, might stand aloof from the
coalition's integrated command structure, much as France does
in NATO, perhaps even disdaining to fight. During the countdown
to hostilities, President Francois Mitterrand had courted
British and American anger by launching an eleventh-hour peace
proposal that would have handed Saddam Hussein a diplomatic
victory by rewarding an Iraqi withdrawal with the convening of
a Middle East peace conference.

    But as the first air strikes were launched against Iraqi
targets, the French, under General Michel Roquejoffre, closed
ranks with the other allies, putting themselves under U.S.
operational command. Guided by U.S. AWACS aircraft, French
pilots flew their Jaguar fighter-bombers on combat missions
deep into Iraqi territory, while French ground forces,
including Foreign Legion units, committed themselves
wholeheartedly to the battle.

    Mitterrand was the deciding influence in France's fortitude.
There were understandable reasons for his initial go-it-alone
diplomacy. Iraq had long been France's best customer in the
Middle East arms bazaar: Paris was owed about $3 billion for
past weapons deliveries when Iraq invaded Kuwait. But more than
markets and money was at stake. Mitterrand had to consider the
legacy of General Charles de Gaulle, who believed it was part
of France's destiny to develop a special relationship with the
Arab world. The President also had to weigh the probable impact
of his actions on neighboring Arab states around the
Mediterranean -- not to mention 4 million North Africans living
in France.

    But in the end Mitterrand's fine-tuned political instincts
told him that in the face of battle, talk of French
independence -- "la difference francaise" -- could not be
maintained without loss of credibility at home and abroad. Once
Saddam had rejected France's last-minute peace bid, Mitterrand
put everything behind securing an allied victory, telling
aides, "We are face-to-face with history." He forced the
resignation of his anti-American Defense Minister, Jean-Pierre
Chevenement, a co-founder of the Franco-Iraqi Friendship
Association who had tried to limit any military action by
France strictly to Kuwaiti territory. French forces in the gulf
were not only placed under General Norman Schwarzkopf's overall
command but were also integrated with other allied contingents.
Overflights of France by U.S. B-52 bombers on their way to Iraq
were promptly permitted, as was the big planes' refueling at
a French air base. Braving critics who accused him of becoming
"a vassal" of the Americans, Mitterrand endorsed the need "to
destroy Iraq's military-industrial potential."

    "It is true that France insists on her differences," he said
last week, "but during combat, when soldiers are down there
together, like brothers, fighting for the same cause, when the
safety of one depends on that of the other, are we going to
engage in games of divergence or opposition?"

    With each week of war, French approval of Mitterrand's stand
deepened, despite perceptible unease about the ultimate
objectives of the conflict. The conservative opposition backed
him; the only sniping came from the far right, the Communists,
and pacifists within his own Socialist Party. But as a member
of the so-called Munich generation, which witnessed the West's
failure in 1938 to nip Hitler's deadly ambitions in the bud,
Mitterrand stood firmly against appeasement. Elysee Palace
aides noticed a deep anger taking hold of him as he watched
Saddam's cynical maneuvering, his wanton destruction and his
contempt for human life.

    Frequent telephone contact with President Bush brought the
two leaders closer and helped reinforce their resolve.
Differences emerged mainly in the kind of language they used.
A master of innuendo, Mitterrand never called, as did Bush, for
Saddam's "overthrow," but described the Iraqi's "political,
moral and military authority" as "seriously weakened";
privately, Mitterrand is known to believe Saddam has little
chance to survive as head of state. Nor did Mitterrand reject
Mikhail Gorbachev's belated peace plan outright: Foreign
Minister Roland Dumas called it a step in the right direction
-- and then sliced it to shreds with diplomatic "corrections"
and an insistence on deadlines that helped Bush fashion the
ultimatum.

    With victory in hand, France may become a more difficult
ally once again. There is a national consensus in the country
that a homeland for the Palestinians must be part of any new
order in the Middle East; thus Mitterrand will push not for one
but several international conferences on the Middle East. "We
will spell out the objectives we consider just, and no one will
give us orders," he declared a few days before the fighting
stopped. Having done his part in the war, the President clearly
expects France's voice to be heard -- and heeded -- now that
it is over.